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New technical standards for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) detect and avoid 
(DAA) systems mark recent progress toward realizing the goal of full integration 
of UAS into the National Airspace System (NAS). The DAA system is intended to 
provide a means of compliance with operating regulations that required pilots on 
board manned aircraft to remain “well clear” of other aircraft which is 
accomplished through out-the-window visual acquisition of other aircraft and 
application of a subjective judgment of safe separation. The requirements for the 
DAA system, including the specification of a DAA well clear threshold as well as 
functional requirements for detecting, tracking, alerting and guidance processing, 
and displays, are specified in DO-365, Minimum Operational Performance 
Standards (MOPS) for DAA Systems developed within RTCA Special Committee 
228 (SC-228). Intended as the first in a series of phased versions, these 
requirements are frequently referred to as the “Phase 1” DAA system. The Phase 1 
DAA system is limited for use by aircraft transitioning to and from Class A or 
special use airspace, through Class D, E, and G airspace. In particular, the Phase 1 
DAA MOPS are not intended for terminal airspace operations, a critical gap for 
enabling a full range of UAS operations. The application of the Phase 1 DAA 
system and DAA well clear threshold within the terminal area is predicted to result 
in a high number of unnecessary alerts when the UAS is safely separated from 
other traffic.  
 
The goal of the present study was to examine pilot performance and operational 
issues related to the operation of the Phase 1 DAA system in a terminal area. This 
experiment was intended as an exploratory study that would be used to inform the 
development of a new terminal area-specific DAA well clear definition, and 
associated alerting and guidance requirements. The two main objectives of this 
study were to: 1) characterize pilot behavior in the terminal environment with the 
Phase 1 DAA system, and 2) investigate the effect of modifications to the Phase 1 
DAA alerting and guidance structure. In particular, the authors were interested in 
determining whether the removal of specific alerting and guidance levels, without 
changing the DAA well clear definition or alerting thresholds, would impact pilot 
performance while conducting terminal operations. The results indicate that the 
Phase 1 well clear definition and alerting and guidance resulted in frequent alerting 
that degraded pilots’ ability to discriminate between encounters where another 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20190001936 2019-08-30T22:44:56+00:00Z
aircraft was safely separated versus when a maneuver was necessary. The resulting 
impact on pilot performance was slower response times and higher frequency and 
severity of losses of DAA well clear compared to those observed for experiments 
examining pilot performance in the en route environment. There was no significant 
effect of alerting and guidance display configuration on pilot performance. 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) 
Integration in the National Airspace 
System (NAS) Project
An Exploratory Evaluation of UAS Detect and Avoid Operations in 
the Terminal Environment
Terminal Operations HITL 1
UAS INTEGRATION IN THE NAS25 June, 2018
Conrad Rorie
Kevin Monk
Lisa Fern
Zach Roberts
• Detect and Avoid (DAA)
– See and avoid (CFR 14 Part 91) requires pilots to visually acquire traffic out the 
window and maintain “well clear”
– DAA system is necessary so that UAS can comply with Part 91
• DAA uses electronic detection from surveillance equipment to track traffic and provide 
alerting and guidance to pilots on the ground
• Requirements for DAA systems are being developed by RTCA special committee 
228 in phases
• DAA requirements include:
– DAA Well Clear threshold
– Detection requirements
– Tracking requirements
– Alerting and guidance processing
– Displays
• Phase 1 DAA requirements are limited to operations transitioning through Class 
D, E, and G airspace to and from Class A or special use airspace
– Phase 2 is introducing the DAA system to terminal operations
Background
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• The phase 1 DAA Well Clear definition may not be well suited to the terminal 
environment
– Some traffic pattern configurations could be inside the horizontal threshold for the 
Phase 1 DAA well clear definition (.66nm)
• As a result, using the Phase 1 DAA well clear threshold within the terminal 
environment is predicted to result in a higher frequency of nuisance alerts 
when the ownship is safely separated from other aircraft
Background
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• Purpose: Characterize Phase 1 DAA system and pilot performance while 
conducting terminal area operations
– Alerting statistics
– Pilot response times
– Ability to maintain DAA Well Clear
• Frequency, severity and cause of Loss of DAA Well Clear (LoDWC)
– Airspace/ATC interaction
Phase 2 Objective
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• One-Way Between Subjects Factorial
– Independent Variable (Between-subjects): 
• DAA Alerting & Guidance – 3 levels
– D1 = No corrective or warning DAA alert; no DAA guidance
– D2 = No corrective DAA alert; DAA warning guidance only
– D3 = Full Phase 1 MOPS DAA alerting and guidance (Class I)
– Embedded Variables (Within-subjects):
• Approach type
– Instrument
– Visual
– Traffic Pattern
• Encounter location
– Before final
– On final
Experimental Design
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Phase 1 DAA Alerting Structure
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Symbol Name Pilot Action DAA Well Clear Criteria Time to Loss of DAA Well Clear
Aural Alert
Verbiage
4 Warning Alert • Notify ATC as soon as 
practicable after taking action
DMOD = 0.66 nmi
HMD = 0.66 nmi
ZTHR = 450 ft
modTau = 35 sec
25 sec
“Traffic, 
Maneuver Now”  
x2
3 Corrective Alert
• Coordinate with ATC to 
determine an appropriate 
maneuver
DMOD = 0.66 nmi
HMD  = 0.66 nmi
ZTHR = 450 ft
modTau = 35 sec
55 sec “Traffic, Avoid”
2 Preventive Alert • On current course, corrective
action should not be required
DMOD = 0.66 nmi
HMD = 0.66 nmi
ZTHR = 700 ft
modTau = 35 sec
55 sec “Traffic, Monitor”
1 Guidance Traffic
• Traffic generating guidance 
bands outside of current 
course
Associated w/ bands 
outside current course
X N/A
0 Remaining Traffic • Traffic within sensor range Within surveillance field 
of regard
X N/A
Experimental Design – DAA Alerting Conditions
Symbol Name
W arning A lert
Corrective  A lert
Preventive  A lert
G uidance Traffic
Rem ain ing Traffic
Symbol Name
W arning A lert
Preventive  A lert
G uidance Traffic
Rem ain ing Traffic
D3
Symbol Name
Preventive  A lert
Rem ain ing Traffic
All Remain & Regain 
DWC Guidance
Warning & Remain 
DWC Guidance Only
No DAA 
Guidance
D1 D2
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No Loss of DAA Well Clear (LoDWC) Predicted 
D1
D3
D2
ALT
9000ft
10000
11000
7000
8000
Altitude	TapeInner	Range	Ring
-05
ALT
9000ft
10000
11000
7000
8000
Altitude	TapeInner	Range	Ring
-05
ALT
9000ft
10000
11000
7000
8000
Altitude	TapeInner	Range	Ring
-05
*notional encounter 8
LoDWC Predicted < 55 sec
D1
D3
D2
ALT
9000ft
10000
11000
7000
8000
Altitude	TapeInner	Range	Ring
-00
ALT
9000ft
10000
11000
7000
8000
Altitude	TapeInner	Range	Ring
-00
ALT
9000ft
10000
11000
7000
8000
Altitude	TapeInner	Range	Ring
00
*notional encounter 9
LoDWC Predicted < 25 sec
D1
D3
D2
ALT
9000ft
10000
11000
7000
8000
Altitude	TapeInner	Range	Ring
-00
ALT
9000ft
10000
11000
7000
8000
Altitude	TapeInner	Range	Ring
00
ALT
9000ft
10000
11000
7000
8000
Altitude	TapeInner	Range	Ring
00
*notional encounter10
LoDWC Unavoidable – Regain Well Clear
D1
D3
D2
ALT
9000ft
10000
11000
7000
8000
Altitude	TapeInner	Range	Ring
00
ALT
9000ft
10000
11000
7000
8000
Altitude	TapeInner	Range	Ring
00
ALT
9000ft
10000
11000
7000
8000
Altitude	TapeInner	Range	Ring
-00
*notional encounter11
• Ground control station (GCS) contains:
1. DAA Display – traffic & DAA alerting
2. Tactical Situation Display (TSD) – vehicle control interfaces & maps
3. Viewer Tool – approach plate & airport facility directory (AFD)
4. Right Panel – landing checklist and additional aircraft info
5. Voice communication panel – touchscreen, transmit/receive on select freqs.
Ground Control Station (GCS)
12
1 2 4
3
5
Vigilant Spirit Control Station (AFRL)
Scenario Design
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Instrument Approach:
• 15° offset final approach course
• Missed approach procedures = 
climb to 5000ft, fly runway heading 
(140°)
“Visual” Approach:
• Report airport “in sight” 10-12nm 
from runway
• Line up for 3-5nm final stabilized 
approach
• Traffic pattern @ 1150ft
Pattern Approach:
• Traffic pattern @ 1150ft
• Controllers will give pattern entry 
instructions
• 45° entry, mid-field entry or direct 
base
• May extend downwind and call your 
base 
• Offset from Rwy14 should be 
~1.5nm
• Each scenario had 6 approaches:
– 4 included a scripted loss of DAA well clear (LoDWC) somewhere along approach:
• 2 scripted to occur before final; 5-10nm from airport
• 2 scripted to occur on final; within 3nm of airport
– 2 included no scripted conflict but interactions with traffic around airport were 
expected
• Alerts and LoDWC possible due to size of DWC definition and 0.5nm offset of right 
downwind from runway
Scenarios
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• Participants
– 18 participants (M = 38.5 years of age)
• All had manned flying experience (M= 2200hours) and were IFR rated
– Manned: M = 3000 hrs in civilian airspace 
– Unmanned: M = 1000 hrs in civilian airspace
• ½ had experience with unmanned aircraft (M= 1100 hours)
– 3 Air Traffic Control confederates 
• 1 retired tower controllers (from Stockton)
• 2 retired center controllers (from Oakland Center)
– 4 Pseudo pilot confederates (General aviation)
Participants
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• Alerting statistics
• Pilot response times
• Ability to maintain DAA Well Clear
– Frequency, severity and cause of Loss of DAA Well Clear (LoDWC)
• Airspace/ATC interaction
Results
16
• 216 total scripted conflicts (all single-threat encounters)
= 18 (pilots) * 3 (scenarios per pilot) * 4 (scripted conflicts per scenario) 
• 536 intruders registered (in truth) as DAA preventive, corrective or warning
– 40% were against scripted conflicts
– 60% were against unscripted conflicts
• Breakdown of (truth) alert types generated by intruders:
Alerting Statistics
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# of Unique 
Intruders DAA Preventive DAA Corrective
DAA 
Warning
Scripted 210 147 (70%) 162 (77%) 191 (90%)
Unscripted 326 160 (49%) 215 (66%) 149 (46%)
NOTE:
“Truth” alerts = actual alert level recorded by 
DAA system, regardless of display condition
• 340 intruders registered as DAA 
Warning
– 29% spent 0 time as DAA Corrective
– 63% spent < 15 seconds as DAA 
Corrective
• Encounters on final and Unscripted 
encounters were most likely to spend 
< 15 seconds as DAA Corrective 
before registering as DAA Warning
Time Spent as DAA Corrective Prior to Warning
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On Final
63%  < 15s
46%  < 15s
70%  < 15s
Before Final
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C or rec ti ve War ni ng
• AC RT = time from when the alert is first displayed until the maneuver is 
uploaded to the aircraft
– D1 condition resulted in slower responses to both corrective and warning alerts 
(~ 7-10sec)
– All conditions slower had slower response times than observed in Phase 1 
research
– Slowest AC RT when responding to encounters on final in Instrument Approach 
scenario
Aircraft Response Time (AC RT)
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Phase 1 research
• Proportion of losses of DAA Well Clear (LoDWC)
– # of LoDWC / # aircraft that generated a DAA Corrective or Warning
• 176 total LoDWC / 472 total DAA Corrective and/or Warning alerts = 37% 
overall
– Consistent across conditions (34-39%)
• Alerted traffic most likely to lead to LoDWC when occurring on final
– Much smaller number of unscripted alerts actually led to LoDWC (26/249)
Proportion of Losses of DAA Well Clear
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Phase 1 research B efore final O n final
• SLoWC = % of the DAA well clear volume penetrated by intruder
– Higher % = greater penetration
• SLoWC greater than 50% = High-severity LoDWC
Loss of DAA Well Clear Severity (SLoWC) > 50%
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• Pilot responsible accounted for 63% of LoDWC
– Most common cause of LoDWC was pilot hesitating
• Late acceleration (< 15sec to LoDWC at first 
alert) 2nd most common cause of LoDWC
• D1 resulted in greatest number of pilot 
hesitation
– D2 resulted in less pilot hesitation against 
encounters on final than D1 and D3
Causes of LoDWC
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LoDWC Category Total
Pilot 
Responsible
Pilot Hesitation 34%
Ineffective Maneuver 11%
Return Too Soon 9%
Turned Base/Final Too Soon 5%
No Maneuver 2%
Secondary Cause by Pilot 2%
Pilot Not
Responsible
Late Acceleration (<15 sec) 33%
Pattern Activity 5%
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• 2 flights into terrain occurred during data collection runs (pilots not provided 
with integrated terrain awareness)
– Both occurred during “visual” approach scenario where pilots descended to pattern 
altitude at their discretion
• Tower raised concern with number of 360s & turns made near runway
– Much more common among pilots with unmanned experience and flying visual 
approach
Maneuver Characteristics
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• Receiving ATC approval was rare, regardless of condition
– Slightly more frequent when returning to course
– Far less common than Phase 1 research
• Initial Approval = # of initial maneuvers with approval from ATC / # of total 
maneuvers made
• Return Approval = # of returns to course with approval from ATC / # of total 
returns to course
ATC Coordination
24
0.20
0.130.09
0.22
0.16
0.22
0.48
0.88
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Initial Ap proval Retu rn Ap proval
Pr
op
or
tio
n w
ith
 A
pp
ro
va
l
Approval Type
Proportion of Maneuvers with Approval
D1 D2 D3 PT6 Avg
Phase 1
• After each encounter, tower controller answered the following questions:
• Tower rated UAS behavior as overwhelmingly appropriate
– Rated ‘inadequate’ separation typically when SLoWC > 50%
– Unnecessary maneuvers were noted typically identified when pilot disrupted 
pattern sequencing
– Communications was the most common issue (primarily not receiving advisory from 
pilot on traffic or maneuver)
Tower Controller Feedback
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1. In this encounter did the UAS pilot 
maintain adequate separation?
2. Did the UAS pilot maneuver 
unnecessarily for the encounter?
3. Were there issues with UAS pilot 
communication?
• Alerting statistics
– High number of unscripted alerts
• Corrective alerts the most prevalent 
– Utility of corrective alert diminished near the airport
• Most Warning alerts either had < 15 sec Corrective (M= 8sec) or no prior Corrective
• Pilot response times
– D1 overall slowest response times
– Slowest response times observed on final in the instrument approach
– Response times overall slower than phase 1 research
• Ability to maintain DAA Well Clear
– Proportion
• Encounter location had larger effect than display condition on maintaining DAA Well Clear
– Most common on final
– Severity
• High Severity LoDWC most frequent in D3 and least frequent in D2
• High Severity LoDWC most frequent on final than before final or unscripted encounters
– Cause
• Pilot hesitation and late acceleration
• Airspace/ATC interaction
– Major concerns with large turns near runway and lack of coordination
• Overall Tower controllers rated UAS pilot performance very highly
Results Summary
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• Phase 1 DAA Well Clear Definition is inappropriate for the terminal area
– Pilots had difficulty judging when a maneuver was necessary to avoid high-severity 
LoDWC
• None above 30% in Phase 1 research
• 17 > 50% SLoWC; 6 > 70% due to pilot responsibility (pilot hesitation was most common)
• Phase 1 Well clear definition too large to differentiate between threats and safely separated 
aircraft
• Follow on work:
– Study looking at new DAA well clear definitions tailored to the terminal area
– Study looking at when to transition from the Phase 1 well clear definition to the 
terminal well clear definition
Conclusion
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Questions?
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